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Perspectives in Consumer Advocacy: Antitrust Parens
Patriae Suits Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act-A Solution for
Wrongs Without Redress
INTRODUCTION
The recently enacted Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act' has expanded the scope of antitrust protec-
tions dramatically to encompass an oft sought but ever elusive
remedy for the small consumer victimized by price-fixing con-
spiracies 2 on either the manufacturing or retailing level.' The
Act reintroduced a familiar form of sovereign guardianship, the
1. CLAYTON ACT, § 4, as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976). See also Sec. 301
et seq., Title III, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT of
1976, P.L. 94-435; CCH TRADE REG. REPORTS No. 249 (Oct. 6,1976). Trebling of
damages provided pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1964).
2. "Price-fixing" envisages any interference with the setting of prices by
free market forces. Prices are fixed when they are agreed upon; once accom-
plished the price-fixing is per se illegal without regard to subsidiary issues of
motive, result, express or implied acquiescence. See U.S. v. Socomy-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-7 (1964); § 1 restricting
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
3. See Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). This case established the 'standing' of remote purchasers to
challenge price-fixing. The court held remote purchasers of zippers had stand-
ing as a class thereby placing the burden of assuming "an active role in a suit by
remote purchasers" on the defense. This would effectively ensure that all par-
ties to whom the defendant may be liable were present and bound by the
adjudication of the passing-on issue, since the responsibility for their notifica-
tion rested with the defendant.
For a full discussion of the ramifications of this decision see Note, Antitrust
Law-Private Actions-Remote Purchasers Have Standing to Challenge Al-
leged Price-Fixing-Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1207 (1975-6).
parens patriae suit,4 in a quasi-novel setting-antitrust litiga-
tion for damages. The legislation is designed to authorize State's
attorneys general to instigate suits in parens patriae on behalf
of their beleagured local consumers 5 thereby providing the pro-
cedural means of circumventing setbacks encountered by
minimally injured consumers when they advance the same suits
privately through existing antitrust remedies or as a class ac-
tion. Though judicial adaptations of historical parens patriae
precepts have been discarded upon their transition into the field
of antitrust damages suits, this statutory parens patriae formu-
la has been submitted as a possible solution to the scrupulously
observed prerequisites which to date constituted insurmount-
able barriers to most consumer advocacy: e.g. standing, notice,
managability, and certainty of damages standards. 6 In deter-
mining whether the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act posits the means for
curing these debilitating procedural requirements, one must
examine each, distinguishing those amenable to statutory di-
minution from imperatives of constitutional import.
One example illustrating the magnitude of the consumer
fraud this legislation seeks to relieve occurred in the Seattle-
Tacoma area during the late fifties and early sixties. There, over
a ten year period, bakers illegally conspired to maintain higher
prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7 Bread prices
were increased by 20% over the national average. Though this
amounted to only a four cent overcharge to any single pur-
chaser, realistically, damage to the consuming public en masse
accounted for a loss totaling thirty-five million dollars!8 Put on a
national scale such a minimal discrepancy may never have been
perceived, or, if discovered, may never have been proven later
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th Ed. 1968). Referring to the power of
sovereign guardianship over persons with legal disabilities, parens patriae liter-
ally means "father of his country" or "parent of the country". In England this
meant the king, while in the United States the right devolved to the state.
For an extensive analysis of the origins of parens patriae actions see Malina &
Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits For Treble Damages Under the Antitrust
Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970). See text accompanying note 23 et seq., infra.
5. The language of the amendment, "on behalf of natural persons," being
easily distinguishable from the former requirement that plaintiffs be damaged
in their business interests, logically can refer only to consumers residing within
the state. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C, as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
6. See J. Tunney, U.S. Senator, California, Symposium, 8 Sw. U. L. REV.
510 (1976). General discussion infra text accompanying note 17 et seq.
7. See Bakers of Washington, Inc., Opin. of the Commission, Docket No.
8309 at 2 (Feb. 1964).
8. Mueller, Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the Retail Food Industry:
Price-Fixing and Merger Policy, 2 ANTITRUST L & ECON. REV. 83, 86 (1969).
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due to the speculative nature of damages so broadly based, yet
the cost to the public would have been two billion dollars.9
It has been proposed that conspiratorial business practices
relieve the American public annually of sixty billion dollars and
this, at 6% of our GNP, is declared a conservative estimate.'0
These impressive figures are rather depressing when one
realizes that prior law has entirely failed to offer a viable civil
alternative to those purchasers who have been bilked in such
small increments. Primarily this failure is attributable to the
nature of the violation and its resultant damages: injury to any
individual plaintiff is negligible, considered de minimus by the
courts,1 while the aggregate harm is tremendous. Such injury is
so broadly founded that courts have been prone to hold private
attempts at antitrust enforcement in these cases inappropriate-
ly represent the myriad differing interests and thereby fail to
satisfy procedural standards established to safeguard each po-
tential claimant's cause of action.1 2 Despite such omnipresent
difficulties, there is no justification for the continuing failure of
the judiciary to respond to such an obvious need with even a
semblance of reform in the area,'1 3 so now congress has moved
to resolve this deficiency.
There are established remedies available to consumers and
even to the states acting in their individual proprietary
capacities,14 however, the insufficiency of these remedies, due to
the procedural handicaps, cannot be refuted. Nor can it be de-
nied that it is necessary to establish new modes under which
recovery could be achieved by those whose injuries are too
small to withstand the burden of complex litigation.15 Parens
9. Id. at 87.
10. Mann, Antitrust and the Consumer: The Policy and Its Constituency, 5
ANTITRUST L & ECON. REV. 39 (1972).
11. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 (1972).
12. See generally infra text accompanying note 51.
13. M. Forkosch, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER (1956). Note generally that
the discussion of parens patriae as a potential remedy for consumer despoilia-
tion hasn't matured in twenty years of consideration.
14. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
15. Raschid, Symposium: A Government Perspective, 8 SW. U. L. REV. 515
(1976).
patriae suits by the States' attorneys general have extended the
first statutory promise for such redress at a propitious moment:
when all the procedural innovations in the area have been tested
and foreclosed by the courts. 6 The question to be resolved is
whether consumers' reliance on this promise is justifiable.
THE INADEQUACY OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
IN SUITS By INDEPENDENT PLAINTIFFS
Antitrust violations are seldom pursued civilly by individual
plaintiffs for a variety of reasons-basically 1) the difficulty in
detecting transgressors 17 2) the difficulty in establishing a viola-
tion based, as it must be, chiefly on circumstantial evidence 18 3)
the expense of prosecuting antitrust cases with the concomitant
knowledge that such suits are lengthy and uncertain. 9 As an
adjunct to this, most upcharges by the manufacturer are in-
cluded in the price passed on to the ultimate consumer which
contributes to the apathy of retailers when it comes to pressing
antitrust actions. Seen in that light, any recovery by the retailer
is a windfall with the final consumer of the goods never being
recompensed. All these factors led to the unfortunate circum-
stance where the majority of private litigations (85%) followed
closely on the heels of successful government cases.
2 0
Federal authorities, because of the lack of funds, the extreme
expense and complexity of trying antitrust actions and finally
the desire inherent to all civil servants to prosecute only suc-
cessful suits, have limited such actions to between twenty and
thirty a year over the past decades with only a recent upsurge.
21
80% of ,all suits begun, end in consent judgments or nolo con-
tendre pleas by the defendants. 22 Criminal sanctions being so
rare, a great deal of the responsibility for deterring antitrust
villainy lies in the civil action: the conflict is self-evident.
16. Infra, text accompanying note 23 et seq.
17. See Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTITRUST
BULL. 747-48 (1965).
18. See generally Lanzillotti, Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust
Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329 (1971).
19. See Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damages Case, 32 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 87, 93 (1966).
20. See Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damages Actions: Do They Work? 61
CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1327 (1973).
21. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. OF L. &
ECON. 365-66, 371 (1970).
22. Supra note 20.
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PARENS PATRIAE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The search for methods to provide relief for the broadly
damaged consuming public has progressed through two sepa-
rately identifiable lineages of authority. Both procedures, inves-
tigated concurrently, have been interrelated problematically
and both have finally been deemed inoperable by the courts.
The two avenues of approach were first, parens patriae and,
second, class actions by consumers. Primarily to support a com-
parative analysis with the statute, a cursory examination of
each follows.
Historically, parens patriae was the theory of law established
to allow states to exercise power affording guardianless infants,
mental incompetents, or charities a degree of representation
they were legally judged incapable of providing in their own
behalf.2 3 The sovereign authority to represent such in-
capacitated litigants derived from the royal prerogative of the
English King and at common law was strictly limited to that
function. Courts have utilized this original common law concept
to create a modified suit, in order to challenge alleged violations
of antitrust precepts. 24 This modification has slowly evolved to
the point where it became recognized as a potent vehicle for
reforms in antitrust consumer advocacy. 25 However, it is signifi-
cant that prior to passage of this "Improvements" Act, the anti-
trust aspects of parens patriae had been extended only so far as
equitable relief for injunction or declaratory judgment.26 Never
had the courts permitted a State in its parens patriae capacity
to recover trebled damages in rectification of its injured citi-
zens' harm, though such relief had been sought in a number of
cases.
In former suits, damages were included in the prayer for
relief on the basis of two claims. First, damages were asserted
on behalf of the individual consumers within the state;27 this
23. Supra note 4.
24. Georgia v. Pennsylvannia R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
25. Despite the preponderance of critical commentary on the subject of
consumer advocacy, reviewers have been imbued with the certain knowledge
that a remedy was forthcoming in the area; parens patriae theory has com-
manded most of their attention in recent times.
26. Infra text accompanying notes 29-33.
27. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard San-
itary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (D.C. Pa. 1969).
intervention was rationalized as part and parcel of the basic
parens patriae power to intercede where public interest man-
dated the guardianship of legally disabled citizens. Second,
damages were claimed under the theory that the state's econo-
my as a whole had incurred injury due to the antitrust viola-
tion.2 8
The lead case in this field was the 1945 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 29 This case was the first
to advance the notion of quasi-sovereign/parens patriae civil
suits for trebled damages pursuant to federal antitrust statutes.
The state sought vindication for damages inuring both to the
state in its own proprietary capacity and, under parens patriae,
as "agent and protector of her people against a continuing
wrong done to them" due to discriminatory pricing practices by
the railway system.30 The court held Georgia could obtain an
injunction both in its proprietary and parens patriae
capacities; 31 however, damages where denied due to a technic-
ality. 3
2
In the aftermath of this holding Georgia has been cited as
authority for the proposition that a State may sue in parens
patriae and recover damages for injury to its consumers. The
pleading quoted above was deceptive, but subsequent case law
demonstrates concession that generally the Georgia case stands
for nothing more than the premise that a state may enjoin al-
leged antitrust violations which do either injury to a proprietary
interest or harm to the general prosperity of the state.3 3 The
court sidestepped the issue of damages by asserting the technic-
ality.34 It also enuciated the opinion that a state would have no
28. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
29. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). Georgia alleged facts demonstrating railroads serv-
icing the state were conspiratorily fixing rates, thereby discriminating against
Georgian ports in deference to neighboring states' ports and holding Georgia's
economy in a state of arrested development.
30. 324 U.S. at 443.
31. 324 U.S. at 447, 450-51; §§ 4 & 16 of the CLAYTON ACT, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 et
seq. (1970).
32. 324 U.S. at 453, 460-63. Rates had been approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Comm., to grant damages was felt would provide Georgia with an unfair
advantage.
33. 324 U.S. at 447-48.
(T)he interests of a state are not confined to those which are propriet-
ary; they embrace the so-called 'quasi-sovereign' interests which...
are 'independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain.'
Supra note 4, at 210-12. See also, Handler, A Change of Focus From Substance
to Procedure-Class Actions, Parens Patriae, and Multidistrict Litigation. 71
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 13 (1971); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (D.C. Pa. 1969).
34. Supra note 31.
[Vol. 5: 77, 1977] Consumer Advocacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
standing to file in parens patriae if it was determined in reality
the suit was for the benefit of particular individuals35 thus effec-
tively disposing of the fourth count in Georgia's complaint alleg-
ing damages as to its individual consumers. 36 This dicta, disap-
proving such causes of action for lack of standing, deterred
further promotion of antitrust damages claims by the states
until fully twenty years later, in a period of heightened consum-
er awareness.
Subsequently, in Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Sanitary Corp. ,37 it was contended a state may
sue in its parens patriae capacity for antitrust damages to its
citizens. In clarification of the Georgia opinion this court point-
ed out that in Georgia, there had been no consideration of
demands for treble damages on behalf of its citizens, only the
request for token damages to the state's economy was taken into
account.38 The Philadelphia holding entirely dismembered a
state's line of attack in representation of its citizens; conse-
quently a second, more innovative alternative was presented in
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co..39
In Hawaii, the Attorney General for the state cited Georgia as
authority for the concept that a state injured in its quasi-
sovereigntal capacity40 could sue in parens patriae and obtain
both damages and an injunctive remedy. The District Court
accepted Georgia as authoritative precedent for this proposal.41
The Supreme Court in affirming the Circuit Court's reversal of
this holding based its conclusion, that no cause of action was
35. 324 U.S. at 446.
36. See the appendix to Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 224 (1970).
37. 309 F. Supp. 1057 (D.C. Pa. 1969). Manufacturers of plumbing fixtures
were allegedly conspiring to fix prices. This holding was based on a motion by
California and Kansas to amend the complaint to include a parens patriae
allegation. The court held such claim to be without legal foundation.
38. Injury to the state's "quasi-sovereign" interest refers to its damages in
its function as a state; i.e. state qua state injuries. This is to be distinguished
from parens patriae in representation of the state's citizens' damages.
39. 405 U.S. 251 (1972), aff'g 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 301 F. Supp.
982 (D. Haw. 1969). Defendant companies in this instance were charged with
conspiratorily fixing prices of gas within the state. Also alleged were bidrigging,
market monopolization, and other activities in restraint of trade in the sale of
refined petroleum products to Hawaiian consumers.
40. 405 U.S. at 258..
41. 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Haw. 1969).
stated, on two grounds. It held principally that the court in
Georgia never dealt with the question of damages at all, either
in relation to citizens' rights or quasi-sovereign interests, due to
the aforementioned technicality.42 Secondly, it pointed out that
legislative history of the Clayton Act supported the view that
injury to a person's "business or property"4 3 referred solely to
"commercial interests or enterprises" 44 and didn't include that
done to the general prosperity of the state.45 Having reduced the
scope of the Georgia decision to its most finely distilled essence,
the outlook for states in parens patriae pursuit of antitrust
violators seemed bleak. Though the very substance of the en-
visaged action had entirely corroded, it is from these ruins
California's Frito Lay case arose. It is this case, which is analy-
sed following the discussion of class actions in the next subsec-
tion, which most closely precurses modern parens patriae
statutory relief.
46
Clearly the single most influential reason for the renewed
interest and confidence in the parens patriae remedy was the
innovative settlement procedure adopted in a consumer class
action against five drug companies charged with price-fixing
upcharges re the drug, tetracycline. 47 In that settlement, the
manufacturers of this fairly common drug paid to forty-nine
states an agreed total of nearly 140 million dollars. The defend-
ants devised the payment of this sum to the states, in their
parens patriae capacity, to be distributed to all interested par-
ties, thereby binding all claimants to the settlement, with the
balance escheating to the states to be constructively applied to
the interests of the damaged class.48 This constituted the solitary
device by which consumers on all levels of the marketing chain
could be reimbursed thus relieving the defendants from fear of
further duplicative suits with multiple recoveries against them.
Without the parens patriae procedure, it is unlikely that either
42. Supra note 32.
43. 405 U.S. at 261.
44. 405 U.S. at 264.
45. 431 F.2d at 1285.
The terms "business or property" are to be construed in their ordinary
sense; they do not encompass all pecuniary injury, let alone all manner
of damages felt by a community. Unless the concepts of business or
property are expanded well beyond traditional usage, the general econ-
omy of a region cannot be regarded as property in possession of the
residents individually or publicly.
46. Infra text accompanying notes 71-78. California v. Frito Lay, 474 F.2d
774, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
'47. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In Re
Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
48. Supra note 4, at 195.
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party could have attained any degree of satisfaction: the de-
fendants would still have been subject to an untold number of
treble damages actions, while the plaintiffs would never have
been able to achieve the broad based relief required in instances
such as this, where price-fixing resulted in a 3,350% upcharge in
the cost of tetracycline.
49
The difficulty with relying upon this settlement process as
precedent lies in the fact that these drug companies stipulated
to the legality of the reimbursement proceedings: the issue of
parens patriae's conceptual validity never arose. Nevertheless,
the incidence of parens patriae suits for damages increased
dramatically in response to the settlement; herein lies the seed
of this current congressional enactment.
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Though once hailed as "one of the most socially useful reme-
dies in history,"50 since the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, 11 no
antitrust class action which had survived the procedural obsta-
cle course has proceeded through trial to an actual determina-
tion on the merits.52 This is partly due to the high settlement rate
in those cases which do make it beyond the procedural hur-
dles,5 3 but largely it is the result of the increasingly rigid con-
struction of these amendments by the courts.54
49. Green, Moore, Wasserstein, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 162 (1972).
50. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death
Knell Been Sounded? 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970).
51. Amended Rule 23 eliminates distinctions between categories and per-
mits absent parties to be bound -whenever specified criteria are met: that there
are questions of law or fact common to the class (Rule 23(a)(2)); that the claims of
the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class (Rule 23(a)(3));
that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class (Rule 23(a)(4)); that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members (Rule 23(b)(3)); that a class action is superior to other available reme-
dies for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy (Rule 23(b)(3)); and
that a class action is capable of judicial management (Rule 23(b)(3)(D)) Added to
these precepts are the due process requirements of notice and adequate repre-
sentation. See Antitrust Violations-Class Action, 6 A.L.R. FED. 19 (1971).
52. See Handler, A Change of Focus From Substance to Procedure-Class
Actions, Parens Patriae, and Multidistrict Litigation, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8
(1971).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
Antitrust class action litigation has had a wide and varied
background but for purposes of this comment the progress of a
single case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,55 will best exemplify
the fortunes of class actions as they relate to the parens patriae
legislation.
Eisen demonstrates the extreme complexity and uncertain
development of class action aspects of antitrust litigation. Be-
gun in 1966, the suit was ultimately to appear before the Su-
preme Court for a final decision in 1974.56 The action, on behalf
of all odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange over a
four year period (6.25 million persons), was declared maintain-
able as a class action by the District Court. Thereafter the
Court of Appeals reversed this ruling: 58 certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court.
The controversy engendered by the District Court's decision
stems from its introduction of a "fluid class" recovery concept; 59
this entailed aggregation of damages to the entire class without
the burden of proving up damages individually per class mem-
ber.60 This device was later the model for California in the
hybrid parens patiae/class action it inaugurated in Frito Lay61
and eventually the approach was adopted by the Congress.
The fluid class recovery concept seeks to establish a fund
from which the claims of the class members may either be
satisfied independently or set to rest by application of the recov-
ery to the benefit of the 'class' qua class, in its function as a
55. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The plaintiff, who had personal damages of only $70,
alleged two brokerage firms had conspiratorily fixed odd lot differentials at
excessive rates in violation of the Sherman Act. The excessive rates on these
transactions were designed to lead to the monopolization of odd lot trading. The
action was initiated in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York,
which held no class action was maintainable-41 F.R.D. 147; the Court of Appe-
als held the order appealable-370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 1967). The decision was thereafter reversed and jurisdiction was taken in
Appellate Court which remanded to the District Court for further findings-391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). On remand the action was determined maintainable as a
fluid class action-52 F.R.D. 253 (1971); the defendant was then instructed to pay
a portion of the costs of notice-54 F.R.D. 565. The Court of Appeals reversed-
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). In the course of
coming full circle and holding no class action was maintainable, a number of
separate decisions were rendered and never was there a trial on the merits.
56. Id.
57. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This holding after an alternating series of
decisions between the Court of Appeals and the District Court. Supra note 55.
58. 479 F.2d 1005.
59. 52 F.R.D. at 264.
60. Id.
61. 474 F.2d 774,. cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
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class. 62 Again, the impetus for this innovation was the ingenious
settlement procedure devised in the In Re Antibiotics Antitrust
Action.63 The one characteristic common to both these cases
and which must be regarded as presenting the most unique legal
considerations, is the internal fluctuation of class membership
in the interim between injury and recovery. Rights vested in
former members are cut-off with the resultant benefits accruing
to the interest of non-vested newer members. The dilemma is
whether this fluidity disrupts constitutional rights or simply
impinges on statutory antitrust principles which can be cured
by the parens patriae legislation? Though the Supreme Court
didn't address itself to this issue, it has been a key point of
interest for most commentators.
64
A second departure from normal class action procedure was
the proviso in the District Court decision that notice be accom-
plished in part by publication although the class had 2.25 million
members who could be identified through reasonable investiga-
tion.65 This emerged as the second major constitutional impedi-
ment to consumer class actions and had analogous ramifica-
tions in parens patriae suits. According to due process require-
ments laid down in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. ,66 separately identifiable members of the class had to be
individually notified even though the cost might be prohibi-
tive.67 "Individual notice (was) clearly the 'best notice practic-
able' within the meaning of Rule 23(c)(2) and (the court's) prior
decisions. '68
It was argued that the stake was so insignificant that notice
requirements were inappropriate in this instance to which the
Supreme Court opined:
69
notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary con-
sideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an unambigu-
62. Malina, Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust
Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 477, 482 (1972).
63. Supra note 47.
64. See generally Handler, supra note 52; Malina & Blechman, supra note
4.
65. 417 U.S. at 166.
66. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
67. 417 U.S. at 156. The cumulative cost of notification was put at around
$225,000.
68. 417 U.S. at 175.
69. 417 U.S. at 176; 28 U.S.C.S. 7765-68.
ous requirement of Rule 23. As the Advisory Committee's Note ex-
plained, the Rule was intended to insure that the judgment, whether
favorable or not, would bind all class members who did not request
exclusion from the suit.
This conclusion blindly avoids a pragmatic appraisal of the
intricacies of this situation, ignoring the fact that such de
minimus stakeholders are legally incapacitated from furthering
antitrust suits in their own behalf regardless of what disposition
class action procedural requirements mandate.
The perpetrators of antitrust violations resulting in multiple
victims, each with minor injuries, have been granted virtual
immunity from civil liability. This reinforces anti-competitive
market forces with a windfall while undermining truly competi-
tive business practices. Despite these considerations, the Su-
preme Court refused to maintain the 'fluid class' action, thereby
surgically excising what to all appearances, seemed to be a
potentially explosive trend in consumer class advocacy.70
The procedural revelations achieved in the area have mir-
riored the eddies and currents within the Supreme Court itself,
shifting to a more restrictive stance with each change in the
court's composition. The personnel of the court having re-
mained unchanged recently, this former judicial devastation
should signal the tumultuous course of litigation awaiting pa-
rens patriae statutory relief before its ultimate acceptance.
CALIFORNIA'S HYBRID PARENS PATRIAE/CLASS
ACTION REMEDY
California v. Frito Lay 7 establishes one final permutation of
the parens patriae action as it has devolved down this chain of
judicial rejections. In the Frito Lay case, California proposed
supplemental state inclusion in a private antitrust consumer
class action. The state sought to represent all potential claim-
ants so that full notice prerequisites would not stand as an
obstacle to advancement of the cause of action. In reality, the
cause was a modified class action, one without full notice
though still encompassing full damages, California however,
was acting in its parens patriae capacity. In declaring its join-
der to the class, California argued that full redress for consum-
70. Admittedly class actions have been sorely abused by attorneys, who to
date constitute the single largest 'class' to benefit from such suits.
71. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Defendant
manufacturers of 'snack foods' were charged with conspiracy to fix and main-
tain prices at an excessive level. California's claim, although pursued in parens
patriae, was in actuality intended to supplement charges brought by class
members when they joined the suit.
[Vol. 5: 77, 1977] Consumer Advocacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ers without adequate notice, acknowledgable damages, or sim-
ply apathetic potential claimants, was appropriate due to public
policy considerations.12 It cited the impracticability of repre-
sented citizens bringing independent suits and the undesirabili-
ty of allowing antitrust violators to keep their ill-gotten gains.
7 3
The Court of Appeals opinion of this ingenious approach is
commensurate with the former Supreme Court holdings in this
area: "the authority of a state to act here as representative of its
citizens cannot be founded on its common law capacity as pa-
rens patriae.-74 This reaffirmed the inability of parens patriae
principles to empower relief re citizen claimants, still, it did
contribute substantially to the emergence of a finely textured
parens patriae statutory formula.
The first contribution by the Frito Lay court was a perceptive
discussion of the interrelationship between Rule 23 and parens
patriae actions. The efficacy of a state's joinder under Rule 23
principles was seriously questioned in view of 1966 amendments
to Rule 23,11 enacting what were attested to be safeguards of
constitutional significance. 76 The court commended California's
motives in prosecuting the suit but denied the class action on the
basis that it hadn't the authority to extend common law reme-
dies into an area pre-empted statutorily.71 It commented:
78
. ..we feel that authority must come not through judicial improvisa-
tion but by legislation and rule making, where careful consideration
can be given to the conditions and procedures that will suffice to meet
the many problems posed by one's assertion of power to deal with
another's property and to commit him to actions taken in his behalf.
As a corollary to this consideration the court pointed out that
indeed consumers were legally denied capacity to litigate in this
type of action. It recognized that the state was seeking to act as
guardians ad litem for disabled members of the damaged
class.79 It seems the court took a pragmatic stance in this regard
rather than adhering to the standard pretense that as real par-
72. Id. at 775.
73. Id. at 777. This was within the purview of contentions in support of
California's second cause of action.
74. Id. at 778.
75. Id. at 776.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 777.
79. Id. at 776.
ties in interest, consumers could pursue the vindication of their
own rights. Here it was acknowledged parens patriae would
provide "the injured citizens with the closest equivalent of the
recovery which, individually, is beyond their reach. '80 These
insights helped stimulate Congressional action.
PARENS PATRIAE STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
Effective Sept. 30, 1976, amendments under the "Antitrust
Improvements" Act were to be prospectively applied, empower-
ing State's attorneys general to pursue antitrust actions for
damages incurred by state residents for price-fixing viola-
tions.81 It has been stated:82
The thrust of these bills is to overturn Frito Lay by allowing State
attorneys general to act as consumer advocates in the enforcement
process, while at the same time avoiding problems of managability
which some courts have found under Rule 23.
The link to class action procedures has been eliminated and
the constitutional barriers attenuated; in short, a new form of
action has been created. These suits cannot be construed as
attempts to represent a segment of dispossessed citizenry in a
class action, it is the total replacement of that class; the state
stands in the shoes of the damaged consumers in a single ac-
tion.83 This being the case, 'standing' is conferred upon the state
per se.
84
The key provision of this parens patriae Act, is that which
posits the right to aggregate damage 85 discussed in detail above.
Once the Attorney General has established an illegal over-
charge in violation of the Sherman Act-i.e. price-fixing-and
80. Id. at 776-77.
81. Sections 4C through 4H of the CLAYTON ACT, added by Sec. 301 of Title
III, "Parens Patriae," of the "Antitrust Improvements" legislation:
Sec. 4C(a)(1) Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action
in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural
persons residing in such State, in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as pro-
vided in this section for injury sustained by such natural persons to
their property by reason of any violation of the Sherman Act. The court
shall exclude from the amount of monetary relief awarded in such
action any amount of monetary relief (A) which duplicates amounts
which have been awarded for the same injury, or (B) which is properly
allocable to (i) natural persons who have excluded their claims pur-
suant to subsection (b)(2) of this section, and (ii) any business entity.
See generally CCH TRADE REG. REPORTs No. 249 (Oct. 6, 1976) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Report].
82. H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Congr., 1st Sess. (1975).
83. Report at 42 et seq.
84. To argue the state doesn't have standing as a real party in interest is to
disregard established parens patriae principles. See generally supra note 3.
85. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(c)(1), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
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shown that the overcharge was passed on to the state's consum-
ers, the only remaining point of contention is the amount of
damages to be assessed against the defendant. 86 The code per-
mits any "reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages
as the court in its discretion may permit without the need to
separately prove the individual claim of, or amount of damages
to, persons on whose behalf the suit was brought. 8 7 When this
process of ascertaining damages was forthrightly discarded in
Eisen, the inference was that any recovery pursued by a state in
substitution for the real parties in interest unconstitutionally
impinged on the citizens' vested rights;88 that the state's action
constituted an unconstitutional 'taking' of property without due
process. 89
Pursuant to the Act, each citizen has the right to elect to
exclude his individual portion of the claim from the total, pro-
vided this is accomplished within a specified period following
the rendering of proper notice by the state.9" Analyzing this
provision: if due process has been observed, then relinquish-
ment of the claim is a valid defense to any constitutional objec-
tion; where due process was neglected, the claimant has re-
course against the delinquent state and may satisfy his interest
against the state's recovery. Either way, the Act may not be
assailed on constitutional grounds in this fashion because it
provides for observance of due process prior to any 'taking' of a
vested right.91
As to the second branch of this constitutional objection, i.e.
that the Act fails to provide adequate procedures for notifica-
tion of potential claimants, unfortunately this issue has not been
resolved by the legislation. Admittedly, there is a movement
toward liberalization of the rigid Mullane notice requirements
86. The Act contemplates proof of damages through reference to defend-
ant's records, to middlemen's records, actual compilation of claims, or even
statistical sampling methods. Report at 38, 47. See generally Erickson, Econom-
ics of Price-Fixing, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 83, 107 (1969); Funderburk,
Price Fixing in the Liquid-Asphalt Industry: Economic Analysis Versus the
'Hot Document" 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 61, 62 (1975).
87. Report at 38.
88. Supra note 64 & accompanying text.
89. U.S. CONST., amend V.
90. CLAYTON ACT, § 4(b), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
91. Supra note 64 & accompanying text.
in this Act.92 Initially the standard is notice by publication, 93
however a qualification is posed: "If the court finds that notice
given solely by publication would deny due process of law to
any person or persons, the court may direct further notice to
such person or persons according to the circumstances of the
case."94 Upon analysis it would appear that the strict Mullane
criterion is still in full force and effect. Despite this, the trend
toward easing the influence of this impediment is evident, and
courts are, for the time being, given a full measure of discretion
in this area. At least, in contrast to private consumer class ac-
tions, the states are more financially able to meet the needs of
whatever notification procedure the courts mandate.
From the defendant's point of view, the possibility of multiple
recovery looms as the most frightening consequence of new
parens patriae procedures: three means of avoiding this specter
have been employed. First, the Act expressly excludes from any
determination of damages duplicative recoveries; 95 second, the
ambit of the Act extends representation solely to 'natural per-
sons' thereby negating the likelihood of duplicating claims by
commercial interests; 96 third, there is the aforementioned elec-
tion procedure which allows any consumer to exclude his por-
tion of the recovery ratably from the aggregate damages against
the defendant.97 The probability that multiple recoveries might
occur runs contra to the very essence of the Act. Parens patiae
doctrine is founded in the concept that all claims are ac-
cumulated, therefore any recovery against the defendant consti-
tutes a perfect defense against ensuing allegations by injured
parties. Those past claimant's rights have been severed by the
parens patriae action in their behalf and they are estopped
from pressing further action unless their damages can be distin-
guished from the state's recovery--e.g. commercial injuries or
excluded claims.
One final topic must be broached if one is to adequately con-
vey the continuing complexities to be unraveled in this brand of
consumer advocacy. With the elimination of the class action
'managability' standard,9 8 how will courts contend with parens
patriae suits which due to their magnitude exceed the bounds
of the competency of the court to efficiently adjudicate the
92. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
93. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(b)(1), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
94. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(b)(1), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
95. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(a)(1)(A), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
96. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(a)(1)(B), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
97. CLAYTON ACT, § 4C(b)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (1976).
98. Supra note 51 & accompanying text.
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issues? It is contended if the elements of the cause of action are
reduced to their most fundamental form to prevent managabili-
ty problems, the defendant will suffer from a lack of due proc-
ess in the establishment of claims against him. Pursuant to the
Act, courts are given broad discretionary powers to fit solutions
to what before were deemed insoluble facets of the action. This
freedom can be expected to result in greater ease in the han-
dling of these cases without concomitant relaxation of due proc-
ess precepts. Nonetheless, where either the burden of proof or
due process sanctions can't realistically be sustained at this
level of simplicity, the complaint will be susceptible to a motion
to dismiss. Clearly there remain ever-present safeguards
against the potentiality of a court being shackled with an un-
managable claim.
CONCLUSION
The advent of parens patriae may be saluted as signalling an
auspicious trend in the law. As the doctrine is readily adaptable
to a wide variety of wrongs currently beyond redress, it is not
difficult to envisage extension of parens patriae concepts to
antitrust suits by foreign nations, 9 or even actions to recover
for injury done a state's citizens through environmental pollu-
tion.100
In conclusion, it seems essential to keep in mind that though
Congress does contemplate a measure of indirect relief to
states' citizens through tax reduction and administrative fund-
ing from recoveries, primarily parens patriae actions serve an
in terrorem purpose; this is a policing act to deter future anti-
trust violations. 1 1 It surrenders transgressors to the mercies of
fifty highly efficient legal organizations rather than the apathet-
ic efforts of thousands of consumers who are without any real
interest in expending the energy necessary to deter this illicit
conduct.
The immediate outlook for the success of parens patriae ac-
tions is rather grim. Regardless of who advances these antitrust
99. See generally Note, Antitrust: Parens Patriae By Foreign Country, 16
VA. J. INT. L. REV. 437 (1976).
100. See generally Comment, State Protection of its Economy and Environ-
ment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 411 (1970).
101. Report at 37.
consumer complaints, certain lingering problems will survive.
Even the most industrious renovation will not diminish the com-
plexity and expense of furthering such suits and these constric-
tions result in long term ramifications, diverting tremendous
quantities of energy and resources away from more functional
pursuits. Although the legislature has come to the realization
that states, rather than individual consumers, are more proper-
ly suited to bear the burden of undertaking civil actions in relief
of citizen defraudation, judicial realignment in compliance with
this premise may take a while to materialize.
10 2
ANDREW B. JONES
102. Report at 43.
